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DEBTORS AS PREDATORS: THE PROPER
INTERPRETATION OF “A STATEMENT RESPECTING THE
DEBTOR’S . . . FINANCIAL CONDITION” IN 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(A)(2)(A) AND (B)
ABSTRACT
U.S. Courts of Appeals disagree on the correct interpretation of the phrase
“statement respecting the debtor’s . . . financial condition” as it appears in the
exceptions to discharge in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), the fraud provision, and
§ 523(a)(2)(B), the false written statement provision. Two major viewpoints
have emerged—the strict and the relaxed. Under the strict interpretation, for
the fraud provisions to apply, the statement must comprise the overall financial
condition of the debtor. According to the relaxed interpretation, the debtor’s
fraudulent assertion of ownership of only a single item of property constitutes
a statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition.
The Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have adopted the strict interpretation,
while the Fourth Circuit has followed the relaxed interpretation since 1984.
Lower courts in other circuits have gone both ways. The divergence of opinion
has resulted in some courts allowing debtors who acquired money through
fraud or misrepresentation to walk away from those debts by discharging them
in bankruptcy, while others hold such debtors accountable and refuse
discharge.
This Comment interprets § 523(a)(2) and concludes that the correct
reading of “financial condition” is the debtor’s overall financial health—the
view of the courts that have adopted the strict interpretation. This Comment
further proposes adding a definition of “financial condition” to 11 U.S.C.
§ 101 to resolve the circuit split.
This split jeopardizes the dual purposes of bankruptcy—to provide relief to
honest debtors and to ensure the fair treatment of creditors. As it is, in some
jurisdictions debtors who commit fraud are allowed to abandon their debts,
leaving creditors in a lurch. Burning creditors in this way may result in
negative repercussions for other debtors, such as decreased borrowing ability.
Providing a clear definition of “financial condition” will help promote better
bankruptcy policy for debtors and creditors.
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INTRODUCTION
Although the Bankruptcy Code (Code) provides the standard legal
framework for bankruptcy for the entire nation, the laws are not always
interpreted consistently. This disparity is particularly significant in the fraud
exceptions to discharge in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2). As a result of differing
interpretations, debtors in some jurisdictions are prevented from discharging
debts acquired through fraud, false pretenses, or misrepresentation,1 while
debtors in other jurisdictions might walk away from debts they obtained by
dishonest means.2 Preventing debts acquired by fraud from being discharged is
of such importance that the principle was included in the earliest American
bankruptcy laws.3 This longstanding commitment to prohibiting debtors from
shedding fraudulent debts through bankruptcy makes this disparate treatment
of similar situations in different circuits especially alarming.
Consider the following situation: businessman Damien Debtor approaches
Creditor Company and asks for a loan. He assures the company president that
he can repay the company, telling her about the swanky office building in
which he has an interest. The company agrees to the loan. Months later,
Damien files for bankruptcy and seeks to discharge the debt he owes to
Creditor Co. The worried president discovers, to her dismay, that Damien was
dishonest about the office building. In fact, he has no significant assets and
scores of liabilities. Now that Damien has filed for bankruptcy, however, he
can discharge the debt owed to Creditor Co. and walk away, leaving Creditor
Co. with the loss—or can he?
This hypothetical illustrates the importance of exceptions to discharge
granted under the Code. In an ideal world, all debtors would be honest,
hardworking folks with every intention of paying their debts, who just fell on
hard times and need some help—though to be fair, in an ideal world no one
would need to file for bankruptcy. The policy behind the Code was to aid such
honest debtors by giving them an opportunity for a fresh start4 while providing
1

See, e.g., Bandi v. Becnel (In re Bandi), 683 F.3d 671 (5th Cir. 2012).
See, e.g., Engler v. Van Steinburg (In re Van Steinburg), 744 F.2d 1060 (4th Cir. 1984).
3 See Anthony Michael Sabino, Preventing an Alchemy of Evil: Preserving the Nondischargeability of a
Debt Obtained by Fraud, 12 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 99, 99 (2003).
4 “A central feature of American consumer bankruptcy law is the ‘fresh start’ policy, which, through the
dual mechanisms of discharge and exemption, affords debtors a certain degree of economic viability in
exchange for the surrender of present assets at filing.” Lawrence Ponoroff & Stephen Knippenberg, Debtors
Who Convert Their Assets on the Eve of Bankruptcy: Villains or Victims of the Fresh Start?, 70 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 235, 235 (1995).
2
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fair treatment to their creditors.5 Unfortunately, the world not being ideal, there
are dishonest debtors like Damien who file for bankruptcy to avoid repaying
debts they acquired through false representations, false pretenses, or other
fraudulent means. To prevent this occurrence and protect creditors like
Creditor Co., Congress enacted § 523(a)(2).6
Section 523 lists nineteen exceptions to discharge for individual debtors.7
Subsection 523(a)(2) deals with fraud and misrepresentation.8 More
specifically, § 523(a)(2)(A), the fraud provision, prohibits individual debtors
from discharging debts acquired through fraud or false pretenses.9 Under this
section an individual debtor may not discharge any debt acquired under “false
pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement
respecting the debtor’s . . . financial condition.”10 The fraud provision does not
specify whether statements of financial condition must be oral or written.
Additionally, § 523(a)(2)(B), the false written statement provision, prohibits
debtors from discharging debts obtained through materially false written
statements “respecting the debtor’s . . . financial condition” that were used with
the intent to deceive.11 The result of these provisions is that a debtor who
acquires a debt through a false representation of his or her financial condition
to a creditor may still discharge the debt through bankruptcy under certain
circumstances.12 However, what exactly constitutes a “statement respecting the
debtor’s or an insider’s financial condition” is not clarified by the statute.13
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuits are divided on the proper interpretation of a “statement respecting the
debtor’s . . . financial condition” in the fraud provision and the false written
statement provision.14 There are two major viewpoints: the relaxed or broad
5 Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code: An Empirical Study of the Supreme
Court’s Bankruptcy Decisions, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 173, 187 (2000); Sabino, supra note 3, at 109–10 (citations
omitted).
6 See Sabino, supra note 3, at 111.
7 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2012).
8 Id. § 523(a)(2).
9 Id. § 523(a)(2)(A).
10 Id.
11 Id. § 523(a)(2)(B). The false written statement provision also requires that the creditor reasonably
relied upon the statement. Id.
12 See id. § 523(a)(2)(A)–(B).
13 Id. § 523(a)(2)(A). Additionally, a financial condition is not defined in the definitions section of the
Code. See id. § 101.
14 Compare Bandi v. Becnel (In re Bandi), 683 F.3d 671, 676 (5th Cir. 2012), and Cadwell v. Joelson (In
re Joelson), 427 F.3d 700, 714 (10th Cir. 2005), and Rose v. Lauer (In re Lauer), 371 F.3d 406, 413 (8th Cir.
2004), with Engler v. Van Steinburg (In re Van Steinburg), 744 F.2d 1060, 1060 (4th Cir. 1984).
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interpretation and the strict or narrow interpretation.15 Under the relaxed
interpretation, a debtor’s assertion that he owns specific properties free and
clear constitutes a statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition.16
Courts that follow this interpretation hold that “a statement of the financial
condition of even one asset qualifies under the statute and therefore the
statement may not be used in a [§] 523(a)(2)(A) claim as evidence of false
pretense, false representation or actual fraud.”17 The relaxed interpretation has
the effect of making the fraud provision inapplicable in more situations—the
more statements by a debtor are considered to be about his or her financial
condition, the more a debtor can avoid the fraud exception to discharge.18
Accordingly, a relaxed interpretation works in favor of the debtor and against
the creditor. Under this standard, Damien’s statement about his interest in the
office building would qualify as a statement about his financial condition, and
he would be able to discharge his debt to Creditor Co.19
Under the creditor-friendly strict interpretation, a statement respecting a
debtor’s financial condition must comprise the overall financial condition of
the debtor for it to fall under the exception to discharge.20 Under this
viewpoint, the statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition must
pertain to the complete picture of the debtor’s financial health—that is, to
qualify for discharge under § 523(a)(2) (the fraud and the false written
statement provisions—together, the fraud exception to discharge), the debtor
must have falsely represented his or her complete financial situation to the
creditor in order to receive the loan.21 Because Damien only told the president
of Creditor Co. about his ownership of a single asset—his interest in a specific
office building—his declaration would not qualify as a statement about his

15 Joanna L. Radmall, Note, Dishonest Debtors and Dischargeable Debts in Bankruptcy: An Analysis of
the Circuit Split Regarding the Interpretation of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)’s Respecting the Debtor’s . . . Financial
Condition, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 841, 841–42. The Fourth Circuit has espoused the relaxed interpretation and the
Tenth and Fifth Circuits have adopted the strict interpretation. See In re Bandi, 683 F.3d at 676; In re Joelson,
427 F.3d at 714; In re Van Steinburg, 744 F.2d at 1060–61.
16 See In re Van Steinburg, 744 F.2d at 1060 (citing Nagin v. Pollina (In re Pollina), 31 B.R. 975 (D.N.J.
1983)).
17 Radmall, supra note 15, at 846 (citations omitted); see In re Van Steinburg, 744 F.2d at 1060–61.
18 If it is a written statement, it might fall under the false written statement exception to discharge, but
only if the debt meets all of the requirements of that subsection. Any and all fraudulent oral statements
regarding the debtor’s financial condition will allow the debtor to escape liability.
19 He may, of course, be denied discharge of the debt to Creditor Co. under other provisions of the Code,
such as the bad faith provision. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3)(A) (2012).
20 In re Bandi, 683 F.3d at 676.
21 Cadwell v. Joelson (In re Joelson), 427 F.3d 700, 714 (10th Cir. 2005).
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financial condition, and Creditor Co. could prevent him from discharging the
debt.
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the fraud provision and the
history of the circuit split. Part II conducts statutory interpretation of the fraud
and the false written statement provisions to discern the proper meaning of
“statement respecting the debtor’s . . . financial condition.”22 Part III will
discuss why, based on statutory interpretation and public policy, the correct
reading of “a statement respecting the debtor’s . . . financial condition” is a
statement that concerns the debtor’s overall financial health, as opposed to a
statement concerning the debtor’s ownership of certain items of property.23
This Comment recommends that courts should abandon the broad
interpretation because it results in poor bankruptcy policy. It proposes adding a
definition of “financial condition” to § 101 to clarify that the meaning of
“financial condition” is the overall financial health of the debtor.
I. BACKGROUND
The bankruptcy laws of the United States have a long history of preventing
the discharge of debts acquired through fraud or deceit.24 Section A describes
the background and history of the fraud and false written statement provisions
in § 523(a)(2). Section B explains the history and progression of the circuit
split that exists today over the proper meaning of “statement respecting the
debtor’s . . . financial condition.”25
A. The History of the Fraud Provision
Section 523 of the Code, “Exceptions to discharge,” lists nineteen
categories of debts that individual debtors may not discharge in bankruptcy.26
22

See generally 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A)–(B).
See generally id.
24 Sabino, supra note 3.
25 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2).
26 Id. § 523(a)(1)–(19). The general categories are as follows: tax and customs duties; debts obtained
fraudulently; debts not listed in the bankruptcy schedules; debts due to fraud or defalcation by fiduciaries;
domestic support obligations; debts for willful and malicious torts by the debtor; certain government fines;
certain educational debts; debts resulting from operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated; debts for which the
debtor was denied or for which the debtor waived discharge; judgment debts for defrauding a depository
institution; debts for malicious or reckless failure to fulfill a commitment to a federal depository institution;
orders to pay restitution under title 18 of the U.S. Code; federal taxes; debts relating to divorce or separation
agreements; homeowners association fees; prisoners’ court fees; employment debts; and fines or judgments for
violation of federal securities laws. Id.
23
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The categories make up four distinct groups: “(i) governmental liabilities, (ii)
liabilities incurred through fault, (iii) obligations arising from divorce or
separation agreement, and (iv) liabilities excepted for purposes related to
bankruptcy administration.”27 Section 523(a)(2) prohibits an individual debtor
from discharging debts:
(2) for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or
refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by—
(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud,
other than a statement respecting the debtor’s or an insider’s
financial condition; [or]
(B) use of a statement in writing—
(i) that is materially false;
(ii) respecting the debtor’s or an insider’s financial
condition;
(iii) on which the creditor to whom the debtor is liable
for such money, property, services, or credit reasonably
relied; and
(iv) that the debtor caused to be made or published with
28
intent to deceive[.]

Although the phrase “a statement respecting the debtor’s . . . financial
condition” is used in both subsections, the term is not defined in § 523.29
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the first permanent federal bankruptcy
legislation, “ushered in the modern era of liberal debtor treatment in United
States bankruptcy laws. While the earlier laws had allowed a debtor a
discharge, many restrictions qualified that privilege.”30 The Act made it much
easier for debtors to receive discharges and limited creditors’ power to object
to discharge.31 Despite the fact that the legislation “severely limited the
number of grounds for denial of discharge,”32 debtors were still not permitted
to discharge debts obtained through fraud or false pretenses.33

27 3 WILLIAM L. NORTON JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON III, NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 57:1 (3d ed. 2014) (citations omitted).
28 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A)–(B).
29 Id. § 523.
30 Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 5, 24 (1995) (citations omitted).
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 696, § 17, 30 Stat. 544, 550–51 (repealed 1978) (superseded by
11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2012)).
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In 1903 Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act to permit judges to
disallow discharge in situations where the debtor acquired credit or property
from a creditor through a “materially false statement in writing.”34 This
alteration indicated further tightening of restrictions for discharge where fraud
was involved. In 1960, Congress backed off and amended the law to permit
some discharge for debts obtained through fraud.35 The amended portion stated
that debts should not be dischargeable for:
liabilities for obtaining money or property by false pretenses or false
representations, or for obtaining money or property . . . in reliance
upon a materially false statement in writing respecting [the debtor’s]
financial condition made or published or caused to be made or
36
published in any manner whatsoever with intent to deceive[.]

In 1978, Congress reworded the fraud provision to its present state and recodified it as § 523(a)(2)(A).37
B. The Circuit Split
The U.S. Courts of Appeals have split regarding the correct interpretation
of the phrase “a statement respecting the debtor’s . . . financial condition” as it
appears in the fraud and the false written statement provisions.38 In 1984, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dealt with the issue in Engler v.
Van Steinburg (In re Van Steinburg).39 In this case, the debtor sought to
discharge a debt of $5,500 he obtained from a creditor by providing what he
claimed was a priority security interest in property the debtor knew was
already subject to superior liens.40 The court interpreted the term “financial
condition” broadly, finding that a “debtor’s oral misrepresentations that he
owned the property free and unencumbered related to his financial condition”

34 Act of Feb. 5, 1903, Pub. L. No. 57-62, ch. 487, sec. 4, § 14(b), 32 Stat. 797, 797–98 (repealed 1978)
(amending Bankruptcy Act of 1898).
35 Act of July 12, 1960, Pub L. No. 86-621, sec. 2, §17(a), 74 Stat. 408, 409 (repealed 1978) (amending
Bankruptcy Act of 1898).
36 Id.
37 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2590 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523
(2012)).
38 Bandi v. Becnel (In re Bandi), 683 F.3d 671, 676–77 (5th Cir. 2012).
39 Engler v. Van Steinburg (In re Van Steinburg), 744 F.2d 1060 (4th Cir. 1984).
40 Id. at 1060.
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and thus fell within the exception to the fraud provision.41 Van Steinburg
remains good law in the Fourth Circuit.42
The Tenth Circuit encountered the interpretation question in Cadwell v.
Joelson (In re Joelson). In the case, the debtor obtained a loan from the
creditor by telling him that she owned several properties, and even drove him
to the properties she claimed to own.43 After conducting an extensive analysis
of the statute, legislative history, and the decisions of other courts, the Tenth
Circuit strictly interpreted “statements respecting the debtor’s financial
condition” as “[s]tatements that present a picture of a debtor’s overall financial
health include those analogous to balance sheets, income statements,
statements of changes in overall financial position, or income and debt
statements that present the debtor or insider’s net worth, overall financial
health, or equation of assets and liabilities.”44 Because the debtor’s oral
statements pertained only to certain items of property she claimed to own, the
court found that the exception to the fraud provision did not apply; thus, the
debt was nondischargeable.45
Recently, the Fifth Circuit had to interpret “financial condition.” The court
sided with the Tenth Circuit, adopting the strict interpretation of the phrase in
Bandi v. Becnel (In re Bandi).46 The debtors, two brothers, falsely represented
to the creditor that they owned specific properties to obtain a loan of
$150,000.47 After the debtors filed for chapter 7, the creditor brought an
adversary proceeding against them to prevent the discharge of the debt.48 The
bankruptcy court held that because the debt was acquired through false
representations, it was nondischargeable under the fraud provision.49 The Fifth
Circuit affirmed the judgment of the bankruptcy court, agreeing with the Tenth
41

Id.
See Stvan v. Mona (In re Mona), No. 11-28112, 2013 WL 4017126, at *10 & n.9 (Bankr. D. Md. Aug.
6, 2013); see also EagleBank v. Korman (In re Korman), No. 09-13311, 2012 WL 4467628, at *8 (Bankr. D.
Md. Sept. 26, 2012) (citing In re Van Steinburg, 744 F.2d 1060); Lawyers Title Ins. Co. v. Chesson (In re
Chesson), No. B-09-81328C, 2012 WL 4794148, at *7 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Oct. 9, 2012) (citing In re Van
Steinburg, 744 F.2d at 1060–61).
43 Cadwell v. Joelson (In re Joelson), 427 F.3d 700, 703 (10th Cir. 2005).
44 Id. at 713–14 (“However . . . . What is important is not the formality of the statement, but the
information contained within it—information as to the debtor’s or insider’s overall net worth or overall income
flow.”).
45 Id. at 714–15.
46 Bandi v. Becnel (In re Bandi), 683 F.3d 671, 676, 677 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing In re Joelson, 427 F.3d at
710, 714).
47 Id. at 673.
48 Id.
49 Id.
42
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Circuit’s interpretation of financial condition in Joelson.50 The court reasoned
that the strict interpretation was appropriate in light of the statute’s purpose
and wording, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Field v. Mans.51 In that
case, “the Court seemed to equate a ‘statement’ about ‘financial condition’
with what is commonly understood as something akin to a balance sheet or
bank balance.”52 The Fifth Circuit ultimately held that “[t]he term ‘financial
condition’ . . . mean[t] the general overall financial condition of an entity or an
individual, that is, the overall value of property and income as compared to
debt and liabilities.”53
The Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have also heard cases involving
the interpretation of “financial condition” in the fraud and the false written
statement provisions, but have not been directly decided the issue.54 In
Schneiderman v. Bogdanovich (In re Bogdanovich), the Second Circuit
recognized the lower court division regarding the competing relaxed and strict
interpretations.55 It declined to take a position on the matter, however, finding
it unnecessary in the present case.56 In Berkson v. Gulevsky (In re Gulevsky),
the Seventh Circuit briefly addressed the issue, but it was not relevant to the
court’s decision.57 In Rose v. Lauer (In re Lauer), the Eighth Circuit
encountered the issue incidentally to the problem at hand. Although the court
did not take time to interpret the wording of “statement respecting the debtor’s
. . . financial condition” in § 523(a)(2), it seemed to construe the phrase in
accordance with the strict interpretation.58
In jurisdictions where the court of appeals has not ruled on the proper
interpretation of “financial condition” in the fraud and false written statement
50

Id. at 677.
Id. at 675–76 (citing Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 76–77 (1995) (“The House Report on the
[Bankruptcy] Act suggests that Congress wanted to moderate the burden on individuals who submitted false
financial statements, not because lies about financial condition are less blameworthy than others, but because
the relative equities might be affected by practices of consumer finance companies, which sometimes have
encouraged such falsity by their borrowers for the very purpose of insulating their own claims from
discharge.”)).
52 Id. at 675 (citing Field, 516 U.S. at 76).
53 Id. at 676.
54 See Berkson v. Gulevsky (In re Gulevsky), 362 F.3d 961, 962–64 (7th Cir. 2004); Rose v. Lauer (In re
Lauer), 371 F.3d 406, 413–14 (8th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted); Schneiderman v. Bogdanovich (In re
Bogdanovich), 292 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir. 2002).
55 In re Bogdanovich, 292 F.3d at 112–13 (citations omitted).
56 Id. at 113. In the Bogdanovich case the issue of how to interpret “financial condition” was raised, but
the court did not explicitly decide the issue. Id. at 113–14.
57 In re Gulevsky, 362 F.3d at 962–64.
58 See In re Lauer, 371 F.3d at 413–14 (citations omitted).
51
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provisions, lower courts have gone both ways—for example, some judges in
the Southern District of New York have followed the narrow interpretation
while others have followed the broad one.59 In addition, a few bankruptcy
courts have adopted a “modified-expansive view” which they assert differs
from both the narrow and broad interpretations of the circuit courts.60 These
courts concentrate on the facts of a given case and the purpose for which the
statement was made or given.61 According to one author, “Courts espousing
this view consider whether the single asset or liability about which the debtor
made the misrepresentation ‘materially affect[s] the debtor’s . . . overall
financial condition’ and is ‘made for the purpose of demonstrating financial
wherewithal to pay a debt or perform a contract.’”62 Essentially, courts that
have adopted the modified-expansive view prefer to look at the facts of each
case instead of using a bright line test for the interpretation of “financial
condition.”63 This approach involves examination of both the statement and the
purpose for which it was made.64 Only a few bankruptcy courts, and no circuit
courts, have adopted this modified-expansive approach.65
As a result of the ambiguity of the phrase “financial condition” in the fraud
and false written statement provisions, both bankruptcy and circuit courts
remain at an impasse. Courts interpret the term differently, leading to different
results in similar circumstances. If this issue of conflicting readings goes
before the Supreme Court, or is dealt with by Congress, the primary solution

59 Compare Weiss v. Alicea (In re Alicea), 230 B.R. 492 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (Judge Bernstein
applying the strict interpretation), with Hudson Valley Water Res., Inc. v. Boice (In re Boice), 149 B.R. 40
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (Judge Berk applying the relaxed interpretation).
60 See Radmall, supra note 15, at 845, 848–51 (citations omitted).
61 See, e.g., Norcross v. Ransford (In re Ransford), 202 B.R. 1, 4 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996).
62 Radmall, supra note 15, at 848 (quoting In re Alicea, 230 B.R. at 503 n.8).
63 See generally id. at 848–51.
64 In re Ransford, 202 B.R. at 4. The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York
summarized the modified-expansive approach thusly:

Some courts have articulated a third, functional approach which examines the nature of the
statement and the purpose for which it is sought and made. Where the statement relates only to a
single asset or liability, the asset or liability must materially affect the debtor’s (or insider’s)
overall financial condition and be made for the purpose of demonstrating financial wherewithal
to pay a debt or perform a contract. This seems simply to restate the broad view of
§ 523(a)(2)(B). It considers the materiality of the statement regarding a single asset or liability in
determining whether it concerns the debtor’s financial condition. Materiality is already an
element of the fraud claim.
In re Alicea, 230 B.R. at 503 n.8 (citations omitted).
65 See Radmall, supra note 15, at 845, 848–51 (citations omitted). See generally In re Alicea, 230 B.R. at
504; In re Ransford, 202 B.R. at 4.
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should be to conduct statutory interpretation to determine the correct meaning
of the ambiguous language.
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF “FINANCIAL CONDITION” IN THE FRAUD
AND FALSE WRITTEN STATEMENT PROVISIONS
When the language of a statute is unclear, courts engage in statutory
interpretation to clarify it.66 There are many tools of statutory construction that
gain and lose favor with courts over time.67 However, some disfavor statutory
interpretation, believing that it unnecessarily complicates the law.68 Indeed, the
Supreme Court has emphasized that statutory interpretation should only be
employed when the plain or semantic meaning of the text is unclear.69
However, in cases where there is ambiguity in statutory language, “accepted
rules of statutory construction can provide helpful guidance in uncovering the
most likely intent of Congress.”70 The Court has frequently used certain
maxims of statutory construction deciding bankruptcy cases.71
Statutory interpretation is not conducted in a vacuum. Judges who engage
in statutory interpretation use various approaches that affect which tools they
use.72 Consequently, the judge’s approach to statutory interpretation has a
considerable effect on how the interpretation is conducted. The approach
determines which methods the judge will employ and in what order. The
background of the judge engaging in statutory interpretation will always have
an effect on the outcome of the interpretation.73 As a result, an understanding

66 The term ‘statutory interpretation’ itself is used to refer, on the one hand, solely to the cognitive
process of ascertaining meaning and, on the other hand, to the entire process by which a court discharges its
responsibility of applying statutes to specific controversies. It is hard to tell which sense is being used on
which occasion. REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 1–2 (1975).
67 See, e.g., JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 140–42
(2010).
68 “A text should not be construed strictly, and it should not be construed leniently; it should be construed
reasonably to contain all that it fairly means.” ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 23 (1997).
69 See, e.g., Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956).
70 N.J. Air Nat’l Guard v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 677 F.2d 276, 285 (3d Cir. 1982).
71 KENNETH N. KLEE, BANKRUPTCY AND THE SUPREME COURT 15–22 (2008).
72 See MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 67, at 137.
73 See id. “Judges answer many questions of the linguistically correct meaning of particular words out of
their own experience and judgment.” Id. (quoting HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1190 (1994)).
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of the approach used by a judge is important in understanding how he or she
carried out statutory interpretation.74
This Comment employs some of the most widely accepted and commonly
used tools of statutory construction in bankruptcy cases75 to show that the
correct reading of the term “a statement . . . respecting the debtor’s . . .
financial condition” is a statement that concerns the debtor’s overall financial
health, as opposed to a statement concerning the debtor’s ownership of certain
items of property.76 Each of the following sections analyzes the meaning of the
statute using a specific tool of statutory construction. Section A examines the
text of the statute, including its ordinary, dictionary, and plain meanings.
Section B focuses on the structure of the statutory language. Section C uses
canons of construction to interpret the meaning of the statute. Section D
examines the legislative history of the fraud provision to determine legislative
intent. Section E concentrates on the public policy rationales advanced by
proponents of the strict and relaxed interpretations.
A. Text
The Supreme Court has emphasized that the text itself should always be the
starting point when conducting statutory interpretation.77 At times, the text has
an easily discernible meaning that a court can then apply to the facts of a
particular case. However, determining the meaning of the text is not always a
straightforward process.78 Congress is not a single-minded entity, but rather a
group of diverse individuals with conflicting viewpoints.79 When legislators
disagree on what the law should be, they may compromise by wording the
statute so as to leave the law ambiguous.80 When this happens, “a specific
application will require judicial interpretation.”81 Of course, a statute may be
unclear for reasons other than legislative compromise. Words lack fixed
meanings; their meanings change depending on who uses them and for what
74 For an explanation of what tools are favored by the different approaches, see Theo I. Ogune, Judges
and Statutory Construction: Judicial Zombism or Contextual Activism?, 30 U. BALT. L.F. 4 (2000).
75 Kenneth Klee has compiled a list of seventeen maxims of statutory construction frequently used by the
Supreme Court in deciding bankruptcy cases. KLEE, supra note 71, at 15–22.
76 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (2012).
77 United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (citing Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth,
471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985)).
78 MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 67, at 111.
79 See Courtney Simmons, Unmasking the Rhetoric of Purpose: The Supreme Court and Legislative
Compromise, 44 EMORY L.J. 117, 117–18 (1995).
80 See id.
81 Id. at 118.
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purpose.82 Whatever the reason for vagueness in a statute, courts turn to tools
of statutory interpretation to understand the statute’s meaning when ambiguity
arises.83
1. Ordinary Usage
The first step of textual analysis is usually to construe the ambiguous term
in accordance with its ordinary usage or meaning.84 “In the circumstances in
which a word is used, the ordinary meaning is . . . the meaning people
generally intend to convey when they use that word in circumstances like
those.”85 In this case, because the term “statement respecting the debtor’s . . .
financial condition” is located in the Code, it should be interpreted in
accordance with its ordinary use in the context of bankruptcy proceedings.
Courts accept that “[t]he ordinary usage of ‘statement’ in connection with
‘financial condition’ denotes either a representation of a person’s overall ‘net
worth’ or a person’s overall ability to generate income.”86 That is, financial
condition is an overview of the debtor’s financial health as a whole.87
Statements that show a debtor’s assets and liabilities, or that showcase his or
her net worth, may qualify under this definition.88 A statement about the
debtor’s ownership of one or more specific items of property would not
provide a picture of the debtor’s overall financial status, and thus would not
qualify under the accepted ordinary meaning of financial condition as
interpreted by courts.
Ordinary usage may be in part derived from a dictionary definition.89
Although the use of dictionary definitions has been criticized, many courts
agree that they are a useful starting point when determining the meaning of a
82

See Cornelio v. Consol. Rail Corp., 585 F. Supp. 490, 492 (D. Conn. 1984) (citation omitted).
“The meaning to be ascribed to an Act of Congress can only be derived from a considered weighing of
every relevant aid to construction.” United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 562 (1940).
84 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 67 (2014) (citations omitted).
85 LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: LAWS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION 53 (2010).
86 Jokay Co. v. Mercado (In re Mercado), 144 B.R. 879, 885 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992). In a similar case,
another court recognized that “financial statement” was not defined in the Code, but interpreted the term in
accordance with its ordinary meaning in a business setting: “the typical balance sheet (assets and liabilities)
and profit and loss statement . . . .” D. Nagin Mfg. Co. v. Pollina (In re Pollina), 31 B.R. 975, 978 (D.N.J.
1983).
87 See In re Mercado, 144 B.R. at 885.
88 In re Pollina, 31 B.R. at 978.
89 73 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 84 (citation omitted). However, dictionary definition and ordinary meaning
are not always compatible. “The definition of words in isolation . . . is not necessarily controlling in statutory
construction.” Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006); see also SOLAN, supra note 85, at 54.
83
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statute.90 Black’s Law Dictionary directs one looking up “statement of
financial condition”91 to the entry for “balance sheet,” which is defined as “[a]
statement of an entity’s current financial position, disclosing the value of the
entity’s assets, liabilities, and owners’ equity.”92 A balance sheet has two
variables: assets and liabilities/equity.93 Logically, a statement about an
individual’s assets fails to give a complete picture of financial condition, as it
leaves out the aspect of liabilities. A definition that incorporates both assets
and liabilities incorporates the totality of the entity’s financial status. This
interpretation favors the strict view held by the Tenth and Fifth Circuits.94
Although words in statutes are presumed to have their ordinary meanings,
this rule is not absolute. If interpreting statutory language in accordance with
common usage is adverse to the intent of the legislature, the language should
be interpreted differently.95 Ordinary meaning may be disregarded if there is
clear legislative intent “against enforcement according to the letter.”96 The
Supreme Court has held that “there are times when the mere letter of a statute
does not control, and that a fair consideration of the surroundings may indicate
that that which is within the letter is not within the spirit, and therefore must be
excluded from its scope.”97 However, for the ordinary meaning to be
superseded, there must be some proof that clearly shows the intent of Congress
is in conflict with that meaning.98
While the Fourth Circuit concluded a debtor’s statement that his or her
specific property was unencumbered by liens constituted a statement
respecting that debtor’s financial condition, the court recognized that this
interpretation was not the ordinary one.99 The court justified its departure from
the term’s ordinary meaning by relying on legislative intent.100 It pointed out

90

See, e.g., Alaskans for Efficient Gov’t, Inc. v. Knowles, 91 P.3d 273, 276 (Alaska 2004).
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1540 (9th ed. 2009).
92 Id. at 163.
93 Eric J. Zinn, Taxation of LLCs and the Use of Balance Sheets: An Introduction, COLO. LAW., Jan.
2011, at 75.
94 See Bandi v. Becnel (In re Bandi), 683 F.3d 671, 676 (5th Cir. 2012); Cadwell v. Joelson (In re
Joelson), 427 F.3d 700, 714–15 (10th Cir. 2005).
95 See Treat v. White, 181 U.S. 264, 267–68 (1901).
96 Id.
97 Id. (citing Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892)).
98 See id.
99 Engler v. Van Steinburg (In re Van Steinburg), 744 F.2d 1060, 1060 (4th Cir. 1984) (“Concededly, a
statement that one’s assets are not encumbered is not a formal financial statement in the ordinary usage of that
phrase.”).
100 See id. at 1060–61.
91
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that Congress did not use the term “financial statement,” but rather the phrase
“respecting the debtor’s . . . financial condition.”101 The court reasoned that
this choice of phrase indicated that Congress was referring “to a much broader
class of statements . . . .”102
Although the Fourth Circuit claimed that its interpretation was based on
congressional intent, it failed to include citations to relevant legislative
documents.103 However, at least one court has found “nothing in the legislative
history indicates that § 523(a)(2)(B) should be expanded beyond statements
about a debtor’s net worth or overall earning capacity.”104 In the absence of
clear legislative intent or other compelling proof to the contrary, courts may
not deviate from the ordinary meaning of the term.105 As a result, the Fourth
Circuit was not justified in deviating from the ordinary meaning of “statement
respecting the debtor’s . . . financial condition.”106
Closely associated with ordinary meaning is plain meaning. While the two
tend to go hand in hand, they are distinct. The next section builds off the
analysis of ordinary meaning to show that the plain meaning of “financial
condition” also supports a strict interpretation.
2. Plain Meaning
The Supreme Court has frequently relied on the plain meaning rule to
resolve issues of statutory interpretation in bankruptcy cases.107 Courts have
expressed this rule in numerous ways in a variety of cases, but generally hold
that where statutory language is straightforward and unambiguous, the plain
meaning of the text must be applied.108 The plain meaning rule tends to be one
of the first tools chosen by the Supreme Court when conducting statutory
interpretation in bankruptcy cases.109 To determine plain meaning, courts
consider what the provision would indicate to an ordinary, reasonable person,
“given the ordinary meanings of words and accepted precepts of grammar and
101

Id. at 1061.
Id.
103 Id. 744 F.2d 1060; Jokay Co. v. Mercado (In re Mercado), 144 B.R. 879, 883 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992).
104 In re Mercado, 144 B.R. at 883. For an in-depth examination of the legislative history surrounding
§ 523(a)(2)(A) and (B), see infra, Part D.
105 See Treat v. White, 181 U.S. 264, 268 (1901).
106 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A)–(B) (2012).
107 KLEE, supra note 71, at 15; see also Thomas G. Kelch, An Apology for Plain-Meaning Interpretation
of the Bankruptcy Code, 10 BANKR. DEV. J. 289 (1994).
108 Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982).
109 KLEE, supra note 71, at 15.
102
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syntax . . . .”110 However, whether a statute’s language is clear and
unambiguous is often a matter of debate itself.111
The circuit split at the federal appellate level and the division among lower
courts indicate that the term “statement . . . respecting the debtor’s . . . financial
condition” as it appears in the fraud and the false written statement provisions
is undoubtedly ambiguous.112 The statute does not provide any guidance on
what constitutes someone’s “financial condition.”113 None of the courts that
have used tools of statutory interpretation to analyze the meaning of a
“statement respecting the debtor’s . . . financial condition” have used the plain
meaning rule in their analyses.114
Although no courts have employed it, there may be an argument that the
plain meaning rule supports an interpretation of the phrase that is consistent
with the strict view. To determine the plain meaning of a statute, the “starting
point is ‘the ordinary meaning of the words used.’”115 As previously discussed,
the ordinary meaning of the term “statement respecting the debtor’s financial
condition” is a statement about the debtor’s overall financial health.116 Using
the plain meaning approach, one can therefore conclude that the plain meaning
of the term is a statement encompassing the totality of the debtor’s financial
status.
This section supports the claim that the language of the statute favors a
strict interpretation. Further tools of statutory interpretation will provide
additional proof that a strict reading of the statute is the correct one. The next
section analyzes the structure of the statute and discusses why it, like the text
itself, supports a strict interpretation.

110

WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 38 (1994).
See, e.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 250–51 (1989) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
112 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A)–(B) (2012); Cadwell v. Joelson (In re Joelson), 427 F.3d 700, 708–09
(10th Cir. 2005); Engler v. Van Steinburg (In re Van Steinburg), 744 F.2d 1060, 1060‒61 (4th Cir. 1984).
113 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).
114 See, e.g., Bandi v. Becnel (In re Bandi), 683 F.3d 671, 676 (5th Cir. 2012); In re Joelson, 427 F.3d at
714.
115 United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 294 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Appalachian States Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Comm’n v. Pena, 126 F.3d 193, 197 (3d Cir. 1997)).
116 See D. Nagin Mfg. Co. v. Pollina (In re Pollina), 31 B.R. 975, 978 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1983).
111
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B. Structure
After the text, the statute’s structure is the next area a court examines in
conducting statutory interpretation.117 Indeed, the structure of the statute is
often examined in conjunction with the text. Nevertheless, it is a distinct,
though related, component of the statute and deserves a separate analysis.
The structure of § 523 supports the strict interpretation of “financial
condition.”118 Under the statute, statements respecting the debtor’s financial
condition are treated differently under the fraud provision than under the false
written statement provision.119 If a debtor made a false statement about his
financial condition to obtain money, property, services, or credit under the
statute, whether orally or in writing, he might still be able to discharge the debt
under the fraud provision.120 Conversely, under the false written statement
provision, debts acquired through written statements falsely representing the
debtor’s financial condition are nondischargeable, provided that they are also
materially false, the debtor made them intending to deceive, and the creditor
reasonably relied on them.121
Table 1 below summarizes the effect of the strict and relaxed
interpretations of “statement respecting the debtor’s . . . financial condition” in
both the fraud and false written statement provisions.122 Under the strict
approach, in which a statement about specific assets (“discrete statement”)
does not constitute a statement about financial condition, a debt obtained by
such a statement is potentially nondischargeable. If the statement was not
about financial condition, then the false written statement provision would not
apply. Under the relaxed approach, a discrete statement would qualify as a
statement about financial condition, so the fraud provision would not apply.
However, the false written statement provision may still apply.

117
118
119
120
121
122

See Zogbi v. Federated Dep’t Store, 767 F. Supp. 1037, 1039 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
In re Joelson, 427 F.3d at 707.
Id.
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B) (2012).
See generally id. § 523(a).
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Table 1
Strict Approach
(Creditor-Friendly)

Relaxed Approach
(Debtor-Friendly)

Discrete statement ≠
statement about
financial condition

Discrete statement =
statement about financial
condition

§ 523(a)(2)(A) –
Fraud Provision

Potentially
nondischargeable (no
writing required)

Does not apply

§ 523(a)(2)(B) –
False Written
Statement
Provision

Does not apply

Potentially
nondischargeable (writing
required)

By interpreting the phrase “statement respecting the debtor’s . . . financial
condition” to mean a statement regarding a debtor’s overall financial position,
the statute makes perfect sense. It would be reasonable for the statute to permit
a debtor who orally misrepresented his overall financial position to discharge
the debt because she might accidentally omit some pertinent information when
listing everything aloud.123 When focusing on a particular item of property, it
is much less likely that the debtor would forget or misspeak.124 Similarly, it
seems unlikely that a debtor who lays out his financial position in writing
would make an error. If the term were construed broadly, a debtor who made
an oral misrepresentation about her interest in any item of property would be
able to discharge the debt through bankruptcy.125 However, a debtor who
misrepresented her ownership of any particular property in writing would not
be able to discharge the debt under the false written statement provision,
assuming that the other conditions of the provision were satisfied. Such a
reading is not as logical, or as consistent with the purpose of the statute, as a
reading in accordance with the strict interpretation.
Although a statute’s text and structure are the starting points in statutory
interpretation, there are other tools and methods used by courts to determine
the proper meaning of statutory language. The next section considers canons of

123
124
125

In re Joelson, 427 F.3d at 707.
Id.
See generally 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A)–(B).

VELTEN GALLEYSPROOFS2

2014]

8/7/2014 12:20 PM

DEBTORS AS PREDATORS

601

construction. While not universally accepted like the text, canons are an
important tool in statutory construction.126 The Supreme Court regularly
considers certain canons when conducting statutory interpretation in
bankruptcy cases.127 There are myriad canons, but only those most relevant to
the statute and most commonly used by the Court in bankruptcy decisions are
analyzed below.
C. Canons of Construction
Like the text and structure, canons of construction are frequently used by
judges in statutory interpretation.128 Although the use of canons has been
criticized by some,129 courts continue to employ them.130 Canons have many
functions; they “operate as tiebreakers in close cases; as presumptions of
statutory meaning that can be rebutted only if inconsistent with other signals;
or as clear statement rules that can be negated only be statutory text to the
contrary.”131 It is important to note that there is no set of rules that outline
which canons should be used or when they should be relied upon.132 Instead,
courts have complete discretion over which to apply or whether to apply them
at all.133 This Comment uses three canons to interpret the statute. First, it
applies the canon that presumes uniform usage of a term throughout the entire
statute. Second, it uses the canon of avoidance of internal inconsistency. Third,
it applies the canon of avoidance of redundancy. These canons were selected
126

KENT GREENAWALT, LEGISLATION: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 20 QUESTIONS 201 (1999).
KLEE, supra note 71, at 15–22.
128 GREENAWALT, supra note 126, at 201. “Canons of construction are judicially crafted maxims for
determining the meaning of statutes.” ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 23 (1997). They have also been defined as “interpretative
tools, which are no more than rules of thumb that help the court determine the meaning of legislation; canons
assist the court in determining the meaning of particular statutory provisions by focusing on the broader,
statutory context.” 73 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 84, § 60. In a 1992 case, the Supreme Court defined them as
“no more than rules of thumb that help courts determine the meaning of legislation . . . .” Conn. Nat’l Bank v.
Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992).
129 See, e.g., James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for
Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005).
130 MIKVA & LANE, supra note 128, at 27.
131 ESKRIDGE, JR., supra note 110, at 148‒49. “The function of statutory construction is to ascertain the
intent of the legislature in enacting a statute, i.e. the purpose and objectives of the legislation. The rules or
canons of statutory construction are tools or aids for determining that intent or purpose.” Craig A. Sullivan,
Statutory Construction in Missouri, 59 J. MO. B. 120, 120 (2003).
132 See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 129, at 7.
133 “Federal judges regularly exercise broad discretion in deciding when the canons should apply, which
ones to invoke in a particular setting, and how to reconcile them with other contextual resources . . . .” Id. For
this reason, it has been noted that judges can pick and choose canons that support whatever outcome they
believe best or most appropriate. MIKVA & LANE, supra note 128, at 25.
127
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because they are the most appropriate to the interpretation of the fraud and the
false financial statement provisions, based on the statute’s wording and
structure.
1. Presumption of Uniform Usage
One canon that is useful in the interpretation of “financial condition” is the
presumption of uniform usage. This canon holds that when the same word or
phrase is used multiple times in the same statute, there is a presumption that
the terms have the same meaning.134 In this case, the phrase “statement
respecting the debtor’s . . . financial condition” appears in only two parts of the
Code: the fraud provision and the false written statement provision. As a result,
it is presumed that the phrase “statement respecting a debtor’s . . . financial
condition” has the same meaning in both of the two subsections.
Although “financial condition” does not appear again in the rest of § 523,
the term is also found in § 101(32) as part of the definition of “insolvent.”135
That section defines insolvent as “financial condition such that the sum of such
entity’s debts is greater than all of such entity’s property, at a fair
valuation[.]”136 The definition’s use of “sum of such entity’s debts” and “all of
such entity’s property” shows that financial condition is determined by looking
at the financial status of the entity as a whole.137 By referring to the entirety of
the entity’s debts and assets, this wording takes into account the entirety of the
entity’s financial situation.138 This usage of “financial condition” is consistent
with the strict interpretation of that term adopted by the Tenth and Fifth
Circuits—the debtor’s overall financial status.139
Applying the canon of uniform usage, one can deduce that “financial
condition” in the fraud and the false written statement provisions has the same
meaning as it does in § 101(32)(A)—that is, a debtor’s financial condition
relates to the totality of his or her assets and liabilities.140 A debtor’s total
assets and liabilities show his or her complete financial circumstance. Thus, the
134 Atl. Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932); see generally Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction and Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647,
650 (1992).
135 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(A) (2012).
136 Id.
137 See id.
138 See id.
139 See, e.g., Bandi v. Becnel (In re Bandi), 683 F.3d 671, 673–75 (5th Cir. 2012); Cadwell v. Joelson (In
re Joelson), 427 F.3d 700, 708–09 (10th Cir. 2005).
140 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(A), with id. § 523(a).
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meaning of “statement respecting the debtor’s . . . financial condition” in the
fraud and the false written statement provisions has been correctly interpreted
by courts that have adopted the strict interpretation.
The fact that “financial condition” appears as part of the definition of
insolvent but is not given its own definition is somewhat puzzling. If Congress
had included a definition of financial condition, perhaps as a subpart of the
definition of insolvent, then the circuit split may have been avoided. It would
be helpful if Congress clarified the Code to include a definition of financial
condition. This idea is discussed further in Part III.
2. Avoidance of Internal Inconsistencies
Another canon of construction relevant to this statutory interpretation holds
that “[a] statute should be read to avoid internal inconsistencies.”141 This canon
stipulates that when there is confusion over the meaning of words or sentences,
they should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the rest of the statute.142
The ambiguous part of the statute should be construed in a way that makes
sense within the context of the entire statute.143
In the present situation, the ambiguous language—“statement respecting a
debtor’s . . . financial condition” can be interpreted in multiple ways.144
However, the relaxed interpretation is inconsistent with the rest of the fraud
provision. A relaxed interpretation of exception to discharge under
§ 523(a)(2)(A) would “swallow[] up the general rule in subdivision (A).”145
That is, if a statement regarding the debtor’s ownership of any single asset or
financial condition in one area qualified as a statement respecting the debtor’s
financial condition under the statute, then it would severely limit the types of
fraudulent statements that prohibit discharge.146 The next subsection explores
this argument in greater depth.
Application of the strict interpretation avoids internal inconsistencies
because it is reasonable to have a narrow exception to the fraud exception to
discharge. The strict interpretation is clear about what type of statement
prohibits discharge, and when discharge is allowed under the exception to the
141
142
143
144
145
146

MIKVA & LANE, supra note 128, at 24.
See 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:5 (7th ed. 2013).
See id.
See generally 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2).
Weiss v. Alicea (In re Alicea), 230 B.R. 492, 503–04 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999).
See id. 230 B.R. 492.
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fraud exception.147 Unlike the relaxed interpretation, it creates no conflict or
confusion with the rest of the statute.
3. Avoidance of Redundancy
Another applicable canon is that a statute should be interpreted so as to
avoid redundancy or superfluity.148 This canon, also known as the “each word
given effect” canon,149 holds that “[a] statute should be construed so that effect
is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous,
void or insignificant.”150 The idea behind this canon is that Congress
intentionally phrased the statute so that every word serves a purpose.151
As briefly discussed in the previous subsection, this canon applies to the
exception to the fraud provision.152 Interpreting the fraud provision in
accordance with the relaxed construction of “statement respecting the
debtor’s . . . financial condition,” would render the entire exception to
discharge redundant. By giving the term such an expansive definition,
“virtually every statement by a debtor that induces the delivery of goods or
services on credit relates to his ability to pay”, and would qualify for the
exception to the fraud provision.153 In keeping with the canon, the phrase must
not be interpreted so as to make the statutory text superfluous; thus, the relaxed
interpretation is inappropriate. The strict interpretation has no such problem
with the canon against redundancy.
The petition for certiorari in Bandi advocated for the relaxed interpretation
and indirectly invoked the canon against surplusage on other grounds.154 The
petition argued that the statute “makes the inquiry turn not on whether a debtor
falsely represented the debtor’s ‘financial condition,’ but rather on whether the
debtor made a false ‘statement respecting’ his or her ‘financial condition.’”155
The petition did not expand on this point, but seemed to suggest that there is a
147

See Bandi v. Becnel (In re Bandi), 683 F.3d 671 (5th Cir. 2012).
See United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955) (citing Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S.
147, 152 (1883)).
149 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 142, § 46:6.
150 Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004). This canon has been referred to as “one of the most basic
interpretive canons.” Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009).
151 See Montclair, 107 U.S. at 152.
152 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2012).
153 Weiss v. Alicea (In re Alicea), 230 B.R. 492, 504 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999).
154 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Bandi v. Becnel (In re Bandi), 683 F.3d 671 (5th Cir. 2012)
(No. 12-424).
155 Id.
148
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difference between a debtor falsely representing his financial condition and a
debtor making a false statement respecting his financial condition.156 The term
should not be read as the former, because the words “statement respecting”
would become superfluous.
Although the brief raised a novel argument, it was a contrived one. It failed
to discuss how “financial condition” and “statement respecting . . . the debtor’s
financial condition” differ. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a statement in the
context of evidence as “[a] verbal assertion or nonverbal conduct intended as
an assertion.”157 It also defines false statement as “[a]n untrue statement
knowingly made with the intent to mislead.”158 Using these definitions, a
debtor making a false statement respecting his financial condition is making an
untrue assertion intended to mislead. A debtor that misrepresents his financial
condition has made a false assertion with the intent to deceive.159 Although the
two phrases are worded differently, this variation in language has no effect—
they mean exactly the same thing. There is no risk of statutory language being
redundant.
The above canons of construction show why the strict interpretation is
appropriate. The next section examines legislative intent and history, two
classic tools of statutory interpretation.160 They are analyzed concurrently
because of their close relationship.161 Like canons of construction, the use of
legislative intent and history in statutory interpretation is subject to some
controversy.162 Despite disagreement by some courts over their use, both
legislative intent and legislative history provide clear support for the strict
interpretation of the statute.
D. Legislative Intent and History
As with the canons of construction, there is some controversy surrounding
the use of legislative intent and legislative history in statutory interpretation.163
Many courts agree that “[t]he cardinal rule of statutory construction is to
156

See id.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 91, at 1539 (the first definition for statement).
158 Id.
159 See id.
160 See 73 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 84, § 67.
161 See generally id.
162 See generally Frank B. Cross, The Significance of Statutory Interpretive Methodologies, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1971 (2007); Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of
Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427 (2005).
163 SOLAN, supra note 85, at 82–83.
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effectuate legislative intent with all rules of construction being aides to that
end.”164 Still, some critics have argued that what the legislature wrote is more
important than what it may have intended.165 Nevertheless, the intent of
Congress at the time a statute was passed remains a longstanding tool of
statutory interpretation.166 In using this tool, courts consider what the
legislature intended to achieve by enacting the statute.167 In bankruptcy cases,
however, the Supreme Court has minimized the importance of legislative
history, relying on plain meaning and other textual tools instead.168 In the
present case, analysis of the legislative history of the statute provides
additional evidence that Congress intended the strict interpretation.
Legislative intent may be determined through a number of methods. Often,
it is established by scrutinizing the legislative history of the statute.169 As one
court put it, “[t]o determine legislative intent, a court construing a statute must
look to the apparent statutory purpose as disclosed by its language in light of
its legislative history.”170 Because legislative history and intent are closely
intertwined, they will be discussed together in this section.
To determine legislative intent, courts may rely on legislative history.171
Proponents of this tool of statutory interpretation posit that “[legislative] intent
can often be inferred, at least in part, from the circumstances surrounding the
statute’s enactment,”172 and that statutory language is best understood in
context.173 Some forms of legislative history are considered more useful than
others in determining legislative intent.174 For instance, committee reports and
164

73 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 84, § 60.
SOLAN, supra note 85, at 82; see also Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“We are governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislators.”).
166 “In construing a statute, a court’s paramount concern is the legislative intent in its enactment, and the
court determines this intent by reading undefined statutory language according to the rules of grammar and
common usage.” 73 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 84, § 67.
167 MIKVA & LANE, supra note 128, at 7–8. “Courts often use intent unanalytically and interchangeably
with purpose to refer to a source of statutory meaning (the intent of the legislature, the purpose of the
legislature) outside of the language of the statute at issue in the litigation.” Id. at 8 (alteration in original).
168 See, e.g., Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 520 U.S. 526, 536 (2004).
169 See Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1078–79 (5th Cir. 1980); 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note
142, § 45:6.
170 Appeal of Coastal Materials Corp., 534 A.2d 398, 400 (N.H. 1987) (citing State v. Amato, 348 A.2d
339, 340 (N.H. 1975)).
171 See SOLAN, supra note 85, at 82. Legislative history is comprised of elements such as “background
information about circumstances which led to the enactment of a statute, events surrounding enactment, and
developments pertinent to subsequent operation.” 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 142, § 48:1.
172 SOLAN, supra note 85, at 84.
173 Id. at 87.
174 MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 67, at 191.
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statements by a bill’s sponsors are given more weight than statements in floor
debates, or by rank and file members of Congress.175 This section lays out the
evolution of the law and the circumstances in which the wording of the fraud
and the false written statement provisions were adopted.
As discussed in Part I, the precursor to the fraud provision, which
originated in the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, prohibited debtors from discharging
debts “created by . . . fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation
while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity.”176 Also, a debtor was
not permitted to discharge debts that were “judgments in actions for frauds, or
obtaining property by false pretenses or false representations.”177 The
precursor to the false written statement provision first appeared in the 1903
legislation, which prevented discharge when a debtor “obtained property on
credit from any person upon a materially false statement in writing made to
such person for the purpose of obtaining such property on credit.”178 With
these provisions, “as of 1903, if a debtor had obtained property on credit
through the use of an oral misrepresentation, that particular debt would be
excepted from discharge; if a debtor had obtained property on credit through
the use of a written misrepresentation, none of the debtor’s debts could be
discharged.”179
As previously noted, exceptions to discharge in the 1898 statute were
exceedingly liberal.180 The presence of these provisions in the early versions of
the Code indicates that Congress has long intended to exclude debts obtained
by fraud from discharge in bankruptcy.
In 1960, Congress modified the precursor to the false written statement
provision in response to “the abusive practices of certain commercial creditors
who ‘frequently condoned, or even encouraged, [would-be debtors’] issuance
of statements omitting debts with the deliberate intention of obtaining a false
agreement for use in the event that the borrower subsequently goes into
bankruptcy.’”181 The statutory language was altered to combine the precursors
175

Id.
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 696, § 17, 30 Stat. 544, 550–51 (superseded by 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a) (2012)).
177 Id. at 550.
178 Act of Feb. 5, 1903, Pub. L. No. 57-62, ch. 487, sec. 4, § 14(b), 32 Stat. 797, 797–98 (repealed 1978)
(amending Bankruptcy Act of 1898).
179 Cadwell v. Joelson (In re Joelson), 427 F.3d 700, 708 (10th Cir. 2005).
180 Tabb, supra note 30.
181 In re Joelson, 427 F.3d at 708 (quoting S. REP. No. 1688, at 2–3 (1960); H.R. REP. No. 1111, at 2–3
(1959)).
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to the fraud provision and the false written statement provision.182 The
amended language “did not explicitly allow the discharge of debts incurred
based on oral misrepresentations going to financial condition.”183
The present wording of the fraud provision and the false written statement
provision first appeared as part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.184
Representative Don Edwards, a sponsor of the new law, suggested that
“financial condition” be given its ordinary meaning in the statute.185 In the
House report from September 28, 1978, Representative Edwards stated that a
debt “obtained by a false financial statement within the terms of [§] 523(a)(2)
is nondischargeable.”186 Numerous courts have interpreted this statement by
the bill’s sponsor as weighing in favor of the strict interpretation.187
As previously discussed in this Comment, the Fourth Circuit failed to cite a
source when it claimed that the legislative history of the fraud provision and
the false written statement provision supported the relaxed interpretation.188
Taking note of this discrepancy, other courts have examined the congressional
record and found that instead of supporting the relaxed approach, legislative
history tends to favor the strict interpretation:
[B]ased on Representative Edwards and Senator DeConcini’s
comments in the House Report, it seems more plausible that
Congress intended application of § 523(a)(2)(B) to be limited to “the
so-called false financial statement.” While a financial statement
under § 523(a)(2)(B) may not require the formalities of an audited
balance sheet or income statement, nothing in the legislative history
indicates that § 523(a)(2)(B) should be expanded beyond statements
189
about a debtor’s net worth or overall earning capacity.

182 Act of July 12, 1960, Pub L. No. 86-621, sec. 2, §17(a), 74 Stat. 408, 409 (repealed 1978) (amending
Bankruptcy Act of 1898).
183 In re Joelson, 427 F.3d at 708 (citation omitted).
184 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2590 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523
(2012)).
185 See 124 CONG. REC. 32,399 (1978).
186 Id.
187 See Weiss v. Alicea (In re Alicea), 230 B.R. 492, 502 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999).
188 See Engler v. Van Steinburg (In re Van Steinburg), 744 F.2d 1060, 1060–61 (4th Cir. 1984).
189 Jokay Co. v. Mercado (In re Mercado), 144 B.R. 879, 883 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992). These are the
statements to which the court is referring:

Subparagraph (B) pertains to the so-called false financial statement. In order for the debt to be
nondischargeable, the creditor must prove that the debt was obtained by the use of a statement in
writing (i) that is materially false; (ii) respecting the debtor’s or an insider’s financial condition;
(iii) on which the creditor to whom the debtor is liable for obtaining money, property, services, or
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In addition to the legislature’s statements, the Supreme Court has expressed
doubt “that Congress, in fashioning the standard of proof that governs the
applicability of these provisions, would have favored the interest in giving
perpetrators of fraud a fresh start over the interest in protecting victims of
fraud.”190 While not conclusive of what the legislature actually intended, it is
evidence that the Court understood the intent of the legislature to be to protect
creditors from dishonest and fraudulent debtors.
Legislative intent and history also have a close connection with public
policy. When Congress passes a statute, it does so to further some policy. In
the next section, an analysis of the public policy behind the fraud exception to
discharge shows that adopting the strict interpretation would promote better
bankruptcy policy.
E. Public Policy
When a statute is unclear, courts may look to the public policy behind its
enactment for guidance.191 Additionally, when multiple readings are possible,
courts may examine the policy consequences of the different interpretations.192
While the importance of the text itself cannot be downplayed, “the proper
course in all cases is to adopt that sense of the words which promotes in the
fullest manner the policy of the legislature in the enactment of the law and to
avoid a construction which would alter or defeat that policy.”193 Indeed, courts
presume that the legislature intended the statute to be construed with regard to
the policy of the law.194 This section first considers the policy arguments for a
strict interpretation of the statute. Next, it responds to the alternative arguments
advanced by advocates of the relaxed interpretation.

credit reasonably relied; (iv) that the debtor caused to be made or published with intent to
deceive. Section 523(a)(2)(B)(iv) is not intended to change from the present law since [any]
statement that the debtor causes to be made or published with the intent to deceive automatically
includes a statement that the debtor actually makes or publishes with the intent to deceive.
Section 523(a)(2)(B) is explained in the House report. Under section 523(a)(2)(B)(i) a discharge
is barred only as to that portion of a loan with respect to which a false financial statement is
materially false.
124 CONG. REC. 32,399 (1978).
190 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991).
191 73 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 84, § 68.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id.
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1. Policy Arguments for a Strict Interpretation
Since enactment of the first bankruptcy law, it has been an established
principle that some debts are nondischargeable.195 Even the Bankruptcy Act of
1898, which contained liberal provisions for the discharge of debts, did not
allow for the discharge of debts obtained through fraud.196 There has long been
a policy of strictly construing exceptions to discharge in bankruptcy.197
Additionally, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the provisions
of the Code allowing discharge are meant for honest debtors, stating that “[t]he
[Code] has long prohibited debtors from discharging liabilities incurred on
account of their fraud, embodying a basic policy animating the Code of
affording relief only to an ‘honest but unfortunate debtor.’”198
Public policy favors the strict interpretation of “financial condition” in the
fraud exception. This interpretation protects creditors by preventing debtors
from discharging debts they acquired through misrepresentation or fraud.
Under the relaxed interpretation, “[v]irtually any statement concerning an asset
or liability arguably relates to financial condition.”199 As a result, the fraud
exception to discharge could easily be avoided and “[t]hese debtors will
thereby escape the anti-discharge provisions completely.”200 This would
clearly be in opposition to the longstanding policy of not allowing debtors who
engage in fraud to discharge their debts through bankruptcy.
Adopting the relaxed interpretation used in the Fourth Circuit would have
negative public policy consequences. First, “[i]t is a simple notion of decency
that someone who acquires money or property through fraud or deception
should not escape liability for his or her wrongdoing.”201 Additionally,
dishonest debtors should not be rewarded for their fraudulent
misrepresentations, which would occur if they were allowed to discharge their
debts obtained through fraud. “The broad interpretation would permit many
dishonest debtors to avoid the consequences of oral fraud. The better rule
decides cases on their merits, rather than on the construction of an ambiguous,
195

See Sabino, supra note 3.
See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 696, § 17, 30 Stat. 544, 550–51 (repealed 1978) (superseded
by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2012)).
197 Household Fin. Corp. v. Danns (In re Danns), 558 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1977) (citing Gleason v. Thaw,
236 U.S. 558, 562 (1915)).
198 Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 217 (1998) (citing Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991)).
199 Weiss v. Alicea (In re Alicea), 230 B.R. 492, 502 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999).
200 Id.
201 Sabino, supra note 3, at 101.
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statutory phrase that grants a fresh start without regard to the honesty of the
debtor.”202 Potential creditors may hesitate to make loans, knowing that even if
they are deceived by potential debtors, it will be difficult to object to discharge.
Therefore, if the relaxed interpretation were widely accepted, it would have a
chilling effect on lending. Creditors would make less loans, and even honest
debtors would not be able to obtain financing as readily. It would be unjust to
make honest debtors suffer for the acts of dishonest ones.
The case of Joelson provides a clear example of the potential consequences
that may result from adoption of the relaxed interpretation of “financial
condition.”203 In Joelson, the debtor worked as a waitress and entered into a
relationship with Cadwell, a retired man, after meeting him at the café where
she worked.204 She convinced him to lend her $54,000 by stating that she
needed it to save her house from foreclosure.205 Joelson promised that her
brother would lend her the money soon to repay Cadwell.206 In addition, she
promised collateral for the loan—she claimed to own several houses, a motel,
and antique cars in other towns.207 When Cadwell asked to see these
properties, she took him to two residences, a motel, and a storage facility,
representing that she owned them when in actuality she did not.208 As a result
of her misrepresentations,209 Cadwell agreed to the loan and mortgaged his
home to secure the money.210 Joelson failed to repay the money, claiming that
it had been a gift from a former lover, and subsequently filed for bankruptcy.211
Cadwell then sought to prevent discharge under the fraud provision.212 As
previously noted in this Comment, the Tenth Circuit adopted the strict
interpretation and prevented Joelson from discharging her debt to Cadwell.213
To demonstrate the negative policy implications that result from the relaxed
interpretation of the phrase “statement respecting the debtor’s . . . financial
condition,” consider the outcome had the court followed the Fourth Circuit’s
202

In re Alicea, 230 B.R. at 504.
See generally Cadwell v. Joelson (In re Joelson), 427 F.3d 700 (10th Cir. 2005).
204 Id. at 703.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Joelson also lied about her identity, claiming that she was the “Jolene Joelson” in which one of the
properties was titled. Id.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 704.
213 Id. at 714–15.
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reasoning in Van Steinburg.214 Under that interpretation, the debtor’s statement
that she owned certain residential properties and antique cars qualifies as a
statement respecting her financial condition, and the exception to the fraud
exception would apply.215 Joelson would be permitted to discharge the debt to
Cadwell. Cadwell, a retiree, would likely struggle to make payments on his
new mortgage and his home might be foreclosed upon. Joelson, who had
clearly lied about owning the properties to scam Cadwell, would walk away
with no obligation to him, free to target another elderly person. It hardly seems
appropriate to make Cadwell suffer for Joelson’s acts of fraud. While he
certainly should have been more diligent—it would have been simple for him
to check whether Joelson actually owned the properties she claimed—the lapse
is not commensurate with such a punishment. As a result of Joelson’s
deliberate false representations, Cadwell would have lost over $50,000 with
little to no hope of restitution.216
The above case raises an important issue: the necessity for creditors to
perform due diligence. Congress is not responsible for protecting creditors
from dishonest debtors; rather, creditors have an obligation to use due
diligence to protect their own financial interests. In Joelson, Cadwell neglected
to do anything to confirm the debtor’s allegations that she owned multiple cars
and residences.217 The purpose of the fraud exception is not to protect the lazy
creditor.218 It is difficult to find a way to protect diligent creditors without
overly aiding those who fail to do due diligence. This issue is discussed further
in the next subsection.
Permitting debtors who engage in fraud or misrepresentation to discharge
the resulting debts in bankruptcy would certainly be displeasing to creditors. If
the relaxed interpretation were the law, creditors might wish to strengthen or
create other restrictions on discharge, and might lobby the government to make
such changes. Congress could create more exceptions to discharge. Debtors
who do not engage in fraud or misrepresentation might therefore find it more
difficult to discharge other types of debts. It would be unfair to cause honest

214

Engler v. Van Steinburg (In re Van Steinburg), 744 F.2d 1060, 1060–61 (4th Cir. 1984).
Id. 744 F.2d 1060.
216 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2012). Even if the court had adopted the relaxed
interpretation, Cadwell may not have been completely out of luck. He may have been able to prevail by having
the case dismissed under § 707(b)(3) by arguing that Joelson filed for bankruptcy in bad faith. Id. § 707(b)(3).
217 In re Joelson, 427 F.3d at 703.
218 Bandi v. Becnel (In re Bandi), 683 F.3d 671, 674 (2012) (citing Tummel & Carroll v. Quinlivan (In re
Quinlivan), 434 F.3d 314, 318–19 (5th Cir.2005)).
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debtors to suffer for the acts of dishonest ones, who are permitted to walk away
freely.
2. Counterarguments
Although there are public policy rationales that support the strict
interpretation, there are some important counterarguments that undermine
these views.219 The petition for certiorari in Bandi stated that “the Fifth
Circuit’s ruling is at odds with the fundamental policy of the [Code],” although
it does not elaborate.220 Proponents of the relaxed interpretation advance
several policy arguments that they claim support their position.221 This
subsection acknowledges and addresses these counterarguments to demonstrate
that while they present some valid points, they do not warrant an adoption of
the relaxed interpretation.
First, advocates of the relaxed interpretation argue that it is “reasonable to
require creditors to perform due diligence to ensure that the debtor’s statements
that induce the creditor to lend the debtor money, property, or services are
true.”222 They claim that without this requirement, creditors could avoid
investigating the debtor’s representations yet remain confident that they will
get their money back when the misrepresenting debtor files for bankruptcy.223
It may be Congress’s policy to avoid protecting those who fail to use due
diligence to protect their assets. If this is the case, then adopting the strict
interpretation would be contrary to Congress’s policy by shielding negligent
creditors from the consequences of their carelessness.
While it is true that creditors have a responsibility to perform due diligence,
it seems inappropriate to blame creditors for being taken advantage of by
unscrupulous debtors. In some cases involving the interpretation of the fraud
provision, the creditor is an individual—often a friend or associate of the
debtor—who will suffer serious financial harm if unable to recoup his or her
loan.224 It is unnecessarily harsh to leave these creditors to suffer for the
malfeasance of the debtor because they trusted the debtor and did not
219

Radmall, supra note 15, at 853.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Bandi v. Becnel (In re Bandi), 683 F.3d 671 (5th Cir. 2012) (No.
12-424).
221 E.g., Radmall, supra note 15, at 853.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 See, e.g., Cadwell v. Joelson (In re Joelson), 427 F.3d 700, 703 (10th Cir. 2005); Norcross v. Ransford
(In re Ransford), 202 B.R. 1, 2–3 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996).
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meticulously investigate the truth of the statement made concerning the
debtor’s financial condition. Even when this is not the case, the failure of a
creditor to perform due diligence does not justify the actions of the debtor who
commits fraud. The notion that Congress would put a higher importance on the
policy of allowing negligent creditors to suffer the consequences of their lack
of diligence than on preventing and punishing individuals who commit fraud
seems incongruous.
Another policy argument frequently put forth in support of the relaxed
interpretation is the need to protect debtors from unscrupulous creditors.225 As
noted in Section D above, Congress specifically addressed this issue in
modifications to the Code in 1960 and 1978.226 Nevertheless, there are
unscrupulous creditors who would use the fraud provision to prevent debtors
from discharging debts that should be an exception to the exception. Although
this Comment focuses on debtor misconduct, it is not just debtors who engage
in misconduct. In fact, unscrupulous creditors are not uncommon in
bankruptcy.227 For example, courts have historically had a problem with credit
card companies in this regard.228
Congress is aware of the problem of unscrupulous creditors—it has been
aware of the issue since at least 1960.229 However, it has failed to take any
further action amending the fraud or false written statement provisions to
protect debtors from unscrupulous creditors. This failure to act may indicate
that Congress does not believe dishonest creditors seeking prevention of
debtors’ discharge under the fraud or the false written statement provisions are
a significant problem. Nevertheless, the potential for deceitful creditors does
not warrant the adoption of the relaxed interpretation, a standard that would
permit dishonest debtors to get away with fraud—the cost is too high.
Another issue with the strict interpretation of the statute, which requires a
statement that paints a complete picture of the debtor’s financial health, is the
potential for litigation. Under the relaxed interpretation, more statements
225

Radmall, supra note 15, at 854.
See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2590 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 523 (2012)); Act of July 12, 1960, Pub L. No. 86-621, sec. 2, §17(a), 74 Stat. 408, 409 (repealed 1978)
(amending Bankruptcy Act of 1898).
227 See Katherine Porter, Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage Claims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 121,
168–69 (2008).
228 Craig A. Bruens, Note, Melting the Plastic Theories: Advocating the Common Law of Fraud in Credit
Card Non-dischargeability Actions Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), 50 VAND. L. REV. 1257, 1260 (1997).
229 See generally Act of July 12, 1960, Pub L. No. 86-621, sec. 2, §17(a), 74 Stat. 408, 409 (repealed
1978) (amending Bankruptcy Act of 1898).
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would qualify for the exception to the fraud exception.230 Conversely, fewer
statements would qualify under the strict interpretation. This means that more
creditors would file suit against debtors who attempt to discharge their debts
through bankruptcy, alleging that discharge should be denied under the fraud
exception. Thus, the strict interpretation would allow more creditors to base
litigation on oral statements. This additional litigation could prove costly to the
courts, and may be analogous to the situation that led to the Statute of Frauds
in contract law.231 Because it is costly for courts to resolve he-said-she-said
disputes, legislatures enacted a rule to prevent these disputes from taking up
time in the judicial system.232 Providing creditors with more opportunities to
contest debtors’ discharge would impose similar costs. As a result, this
litigation would consist of one party’s word against the other’s. The creditor
would claim the debtor only talked about one thing and the debtor would deny
it. As a result, courts may spend more time on evidentiary issues than other
pressing bankruptcy matters.
The policy behind the fraud exception to discharge is to protect creditors by
preventing dishonest debtors from discharging debts obtained through fraud.233
Congress likely enacted multiple exceptions to discharge because it viewed the
policy of preventing discharge in certain situations as more important than
avoiding messy litigation. Dealing with evidentiary issues in cases brought
under the fraud provision is just a side effect of preventing debtors from
discharging certain debts that Congress decided should be nondischargeable.
Another policy objective promoted by supporters of the relaxed
interpretation is the importance of the fresh start for debtors.234 While this
policy is important, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the fresh start was
intended for honest debtors, not debtors who engaged in fraud.235 Adopting the
strict interpretation will not take away the promise of the fresh start for honest
debtors. In fact, reserving the promise of a fresh start only for honest debtors
may prevent some dishonest individuals from acting fraudulently, since they

230

Weiss v. Alicea (In re Alicea), 230 B.R. 492, 502 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999).
See 9 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 21:1 (4th ed. 2012).
232 Id.
233 See supra Part II.E.
234 Radmall, supra note 15, at 853.
235 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991) (citing Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244
(1934) (“But in the same breath that we have invoked this ‘fresh start’ policy, we have been careful to explain
that the Act limits the opportunity for a completely unencumbered new beginning to the ‘honest but
unfortunate debtor.’”).
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would know that their fraudulent debts could not be discharged through
bankruptcy.
CONCLUSION
The correct interpretation of “statement respecting the debtor’s . . .
financial condition” is that the phrase requires a statement about the debtor’s
overall financial health. This finding is supported by multiple statutory
construction and public policy considerations.236 Recall the hypothetical from
the Introduction about debtor Damien obtaining funds from Creditor Co.
through misrepresentation, and then attempting to shed the debt through
bankruptcy.237 While this example is overly simplified, it demonstrates the
effects of the different interpretations of “respecting the debtor’s . . . financial
condition” in the fraud and false written statement provisions of § 523(a)(2).238
The Fifth Circuit’s recent opinion in Bandi renewed the circuit split on the
proper interpretation of this ambiguous phrase.239 Each circuit court that has
encountered the issue, save the Fourth and the Second Circuits, has either
definitively expressed or tended to support the strict interpretation.240 While
the Supreme Court has denied the petition for certiorari in Bandi, it may still
choose to deal with the issue in the future. Because this is a significant
problem, however, it is not optimal to just wait and see if the Court will decide
a case on this issue. A prompt resolution may be accomplished through
Congressional action.
After conducting statutory interpretation on the phrase “a statement
respecting the debtor’s . . . financial condition” in the fraud and false written
statement provisions, it seems clear that the strict interpretation espoused by
the Tenth and Fifth Circuits is superior. The text and structure of the statute
support the strict interpretation. In addition, certain canons of construction also
favor the strict construction.

236

See supra Part II.
See supra Introduction.
238 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (2012).
239 Bandi v. Becnel (In re Bandi), 683 F.3d 671, 677–78 (5th Cir. 2012).
240 Compare In re Bandi, 683 F.3d at 677–79, and Cadwell v. Joelson (In re Joelson), 427 F.3d 700, 707
(10th Cir. 2005), and Rose v. Lauer (In re Lauer), 371 F.3d 406, 413–14 (8th Cir. 2004), with Schneiderman v.
Bogdanovich (In re Bogdanovich), 292 F.3d 104, 112–13 (2d Cir. 2002), and Engler v. Van Steinburg (In re
Van Steinburg), 744 F.2d 1060, 1061 (4th Cir. 1984).
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Congress clearly intended a strict interpretation of “a statement respecting
the debtor’s . . . financial condition.” The legislative history, including the
floor statements by sponsors of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, indicate
that Congress intended the fraud provision and the false statement provision to
protect victims of fraud by preventing debtors from discharging debts obtained
through false pretenses.241 The public policy motive is even stronger than the
statutory interpretation argument. Most courts agree that the strict
interpretation yields better public policy results because it prevents dishonest
debtors from escaping their obligations.242
Resolution of this issue is important because it determines whether the
fraud provision can be used to fulfill its purpose of protecting creditors from
dishonest debtors. In jurisdictions that adopt the relaxed interpretation,
dishonest debtors are rewarded for their fraudulent misrepresentations. Instead
of denying the discharge of fraudulently obtained debt, these courts permit
“bad” debtors to enjoy a fresh start. Certainly creditors have some duty to
practice caution with their investments; nevertheless, it is hardly good public
policy to punish them for failing to investigate debtors’ claims about assets or
liabilities by rewarding a debtor who has engaged in intentional deceit.
Although statutory interpretation demonstrates that the strict interpretation
is more in line with the meaning of the Code, Congress’s intent, and public
policy than the relaxed interpretation, neither interpretation is perfect.
Nevertheless, the strict interpretation is superior and should be adopted.
Since the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari in Bandi, perhaps the most
efficient solution is for Congress to define “financial condition” as the debtor’s
overall financial health and status in § 101. Adding a definition to § 101 would
settle the disagreement regarding the proper statutory interpretation, and allow
bankruptcy courts to apply the fraud provision consistently and in accordance
with public policy. The new subsection could be inserted as 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(21C), and would clearly indicate the scope of “financial condition.” This
Comment proposes the following for the definition:
(21C) The term “financial condition” means overall financial status,
including both assets and liabilities.

The proposed definition makes it clear that “financial condition” does not
refer to the ownership of any particular item or items of property. This wording
241
242

124 CONG. REC. 32,399 (1978).
See, e.g., Weiss v. Alicea (In re Alicea), 230 B.R. 492, 504 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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is consistent with the rest of § 101 and gives a simple yet comprehensive
explanation of the scope of the term. It also expands on the partial definition of
“financial condition” found in the definition of “insolvent.”243 While the
definition in § 101(32) indicates that financial condition comprises both assets
and liabilities, it does not expressly say whether it refers to the overall financial
health of the debtor.244 Adding this definition to the Code will solve the
problem of the circuit split, and prevent dishonest debtors from discharging
debts acquired through fraud.245
By adding a definition of financial condition to § 101, Congress can
dispose of the issue and prevent continued discord among the circuits.
Furthermore, the change is so minor, and the public policy arguments in favor
of it are so strong, that it seems unlikely there will be significant debate about
the measure. While the problem of unscrupulous creditors remains, that would
be a separate issue for Congress to deal with.
While the relaxed interpretation used to be widespread, today more and
more courts are adopting the strict interpretation in accordance with statutory
interpretation of the Code.246 This shift in opinion represents the beginning of a
larger change that promotes fairer bankruptcy policy for both creditors and
debtors.
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